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Economic Nationalism and Economic Integration: 





This paper seeks to reconcile two seemingly contradictory strands in the literature on 
economic development in the late nineteenth century Habsburg Empire - one emphasizing the 
centrifugal impact of rising intra-empire of nationalism, the other stressing significant 
improvements in market integration across the empire. We argue that the process of market 
integration was systematically asymmetric, shaped by intensifying intra-empire nationality 
conflicts. While grain markets in Austria-Hungary became overall more integrated over time, 
they also became systematically biased: regions with a similar ethno-linguistic composition of 
their population came to display significantly smaller price gaps between each other than 
regions with different compositions. The emergence and persistence of this differential 
integration cannot be explained by changes in infrastructure and transport costs, simple 
geographical features or asymmetric integration with neighbouring regions abroad. Instead, 
differential integration along ethno-linguistic lines was driven by the formation of ethno-
linguistic networks. Finally, the analysis shows that the emerging pre-war regional integration 
patterns – shaped by nationalist sentiment – effectively anticipated the post-war settlement: 
the fault lines along which the Habsburg Empire was to break up eventually are evident in the 
price data about a quarter of a century or so before the outbreak of the First World War. 
JEL Code: F15, J15, N13. 
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At the turn of the twentieth century, the now long-defunct Habsburg 
Empire was among the leading powers of Europe, with a share of 
roughly 13 per cent in total European population and producing about 
10 per cent of Europe’s GDP. By the end of the First World War, the 
empire had militarily, politically and economically collapsed. The 
Treaties of St Germain (1919) and Trianon (1920) merely confirmed 
what had become reality from late October 1918: the Monarchy was 
dismembered and its territories were either incorporated into new 
nation states or ceded to neighbouring countries. Austria and 
Hungary were reduced to small landlocked countries, while 
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Poland emerged as independent 
nation states. The lands once tied together in a multinational customs 
and monetary union were now separated by no less than eleven 
national borders, quantitative and non-quantitative barriers to trade 
and different national currencies.  
There is an extensive historiography, reaching back into the 
years immediately after the First World War, which examines the rise 
and impact of nationalism in the Habsburg Monarchy as a multi-
national state.
3 Irrespective of different analytical perspectives, the 
centrifugal, disintegrative forces of intra-empire nationalism have 
frequently been identified as key ingredients in a Habsburg story of 
‘imperial decline and dissolution’.
4 Yet most of this historical literature 
has a lot more to say on the political origins and consequences of 
nationality conflicts within the empire than on their economic 
dimensions. A more recent literature on economic nationalism, 
especially on the cooperative movement within the Habsburg Empire 
has started to explore the formation of economic institutions along 
                                                 
3 Recent work includes Berend, History derailed; see also Rudolph and Good, eds., 
Nationalism and empire. 
4 Jaszi, Dissolution; Kornish, ‘Constitutional aspects’; Wank, ‘Habsburg Empire’ and 
‘Reflections’; Lieven, Russian Empire.   4
ethno-linguistic lines.
5 However, we still know very little about the 
extent to which, say, Czechs or Germans, Poles or Hungarians were 
conditioned in their economic behaviour by language, nationality or 
loyalty to their region and if behaviour along such lines changed over 
t i m e .  W h a t  w e  d o  k n o w  f r o m  t h e  m a inly political historiography is 
that over the second half of the nineteenth century, and with some 
variation in intensity, antagonism between different national and 
ethnic groups gained in importance.  
In contrast , there is another branch in the historiography that 
rejects the notion of the empire’s fall as inevitable or the Habsburg 
state as having become unviable.
6 This seems to be supported by 
findings of the last thirty or so years of quantitative research into the 
economic development of the Habsburg Monarchy. Modern Economic 
Growth began to emerge in the empire’s western regions in the late 
eighteenth century and diffused gradually to the less advanced 
regions. This diffusion process went hand-in-hand with a spatial 
widening in market integration, stimulated by improvements in 
infrastructure during the nineteenth century.
7 Here the main message 
emerging is one of ‘imperial stability’ rather than decline. The issue 
then is whether and how these seemingly contradictory findings of 
intra-empire nationalism and intra-empire economic integration 
across regions can be squared. 
In this paper we argue market integration proceeded 
asymmetrically, shaped by intensifying intra-empire nationality 
conflicts that, in a way, foreshadowed the dissolution of the Empire. 
Drawing on price evidence from grain markets, we show that overall 
market integration improved over time. This tallies fully with previous 
findings in the literature and is consistent with the evidence on 
                                                 
5 Pogany et al., Nationale Wirtschaft;  Lorenz, eds., Cooperatives in ethnic conflicts. 
6 E.g. Sked, Decline and fall. 
7 Good, Economic rise; Komlos, Customs union, and Stature, nutrition and economic 
development.   5
infrastructure improvements.
8 However, such ‘global’ integration does 
not preclude the possibility that market integration evolved 
asymmetrically over time: some region or city pairs may have 
integrated relatively more than others. To explore this issue and to 
assess the potential quantitative significance of intra-empire 
nationalism therein, we examine the impact or otherwise of broadly 
conceived home bias within an analytical framework that is cognizant 
of the profound ethnic heterogeneity across the Habsburg domains 
and informed by the recent literature on the trade creating and trade 
diverting effects of social and ethnic networks. Our analysis suggests 
that over time market integration became systematically biased: 
regions with a similar ethno-linguistic composition of the population 
displayed significantly smaller price gaps between each other than 
regions with different compositions. The emergence and persistence 
of such differential integration cannot be explained by changes in 
infrastructure and transport costs, simple geographical features, 
asymmetric integration with neighbouring regions abroad, or by 
difficulties of communication between language groups. Instead, the 
evidence shows that the observed asymmetries in market integration 
were related to the effects of ethno-linguistic networks. Finally, the 
emerging pre-war regional integration patterns – shaped by 
nationalist sentiment – effectively anticipated the post-war 
settlement: the fault lines along which the Habsburg Empire was to 
break up eventually are evident in the price data about a quarter of a 
century or so before the outbreak of the First World War. We 
conclude that intensifying intra-empire nationality conflicts led to 
severely asymmetric patterns of market integration – economic 
nationalism mattered.  
                                                 
8  Good, Economic rise.   6
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I briefly 
sketches out key issues in the historiography on the significance of 
nationality conflicts in Habsburg economic development since 1867. 
Section II explains our empirical approach to assess the effects of 
intra-empire nationalism on market integration and outlines our new 
dataset on prices, infrastructure, freight rates and measures of 
ethno-linguistic heterogeneity across the empire. Section III presents 
the results of estimating the impact of ethno-linguistic networks on 
inter-regional price gaps. Section IV includes several robustness 
checks on the finding that asymmetric patterns of market integration 
were driven by the effects of nationalism as distinct from 
communication effects. Section V explores briefly the extent to which 
the thrust of pre-war intra-empire economic nationalism is reflected 
in the post-war boundaries of the Habsburg successor states. The 





The ultimate causes of Austria-Hungary’s dissolution are still heavily 
disputed in the historical literature. However, nationalism features as 
a key variable in most approaches, irrespective of whether they adopt 
a structuralist perspective on imperial decline
9, point to the failure of 
political elites at the centre to engineer reform and maintain 
legitimacy
10 or focus on the uncompromising pursuit of, effectively, 
mutually exclusive political aims by the different national 
communities in the crownlands
11. In short, historians have since long 
argued that the rise of national self-consciousness and growing 
                                                 
9 Wank, ‘Habsburg Empire’, and ‘Reflections’. 
10 Jaszi, Dissolution; Taylor, Hapsburg Monarchy. 
11 Kornish, ‘Constitutional aspects’; Lieven, Russian Empire.   7
conflict among the empire’s various ‘nationalities’, and the failure of 
the 1867 Constitutional Settlement between Austria and Hungary to 
offer an institutional arrangement capable of diffusing this conflict, 
were major factors in the empire’s decline. In that view, the First 
World War was the final blow in a long process of dissolution. Linked 
to this perspective is the notion that inter-regional inequality and 
intensifying intra-empire economic nationalism undermined the 
coherence and performance of the Habsburg economy which, 
ultimately, only served to accelerate the empire’s demise in a war it 
was not economically fit to fight. Oszkár Jászi in his classic 
Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy (1929) put this case most 
dramatically when he wrote that, ‘by 1913, the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy was already a defeated empire from the economic point of 
view’. 
However, there is also a dissenting historiography. It was losing 
the war that finished off the empire, but not any insurmountable 
structural, political or economic problems in the preceding decades 
making for inevitable decline and dissolution.
12 Interpretations along 
these line are broadly in tune with the findings of quantitative 
research on the economic history of the Habsburg Monarchy. These 
make for a less damning assessment of Austria-Hungary’s economic 
performance than earlier writing in the field.
13 Even though economic 
growth and structural change in the empire were not nearly rapid 
enough to catch-up with the European leaders before the war
14, the 
work of, in particular, David Good and John Komlos has shown that 
the origins of Kuznetsian Modern Economic Growth in the western 
regions of the empire reach back into the eighteenth century, that 
growth impulses began to diffuse gradually from the more developed 
                                                 
12 Sked, Decline and fall. 
13 For example, Gerschenkron, Economic backwardness. 
14 Schulze, ‘Patterns of growth’, and ‘Origins of catch-up failure’.   8
western to the less advanced eastern and south-eastern regions and 
that broad intra-empire market integration across the crownlands 
made significant progress up to 1914.
15 The fact that the empire lost 
the Great War and that economic factors played a major role in this 
tells us that the war it came to fight was of a scale too large to 
sustain on the basis of the resources at its disposal.
16 I t  d o e s  n o t  
necessarily imply that Austria-Hungary’s economy was too 
underdeveloped to maintain the empire’s territorial integrity in 
peacetime (or, for that matter, in times of wars that made less 
demands on human and material resources). 
Bruckmüller and Sandgruber observe an apparent contradiction 
between, on the one hand, increasing inter-regional economic 
integration within the empire over the 19
th century and, on the other, 
the simultaneous rise of nationalist movements ‘based mainly on 
common language or national consciousness (…) [that] strongly ran 
counter to the collective consciousness of belonging to a common 
state’.
17 Yet the historical evidence on the impact of nationalism on 
the empire’s economy is patchy and ambiguous. For instance, at 
governmental level, the post-1867 empire had an inbuilt potential 
break-line: the customs union between Austria and Hungary had to 
be renegotiated every ten years (and approved by both parliaments) 
and so had the so-called ‘quota’. Common affairs (largely the army) 
were paid for out of tariff revenue and the quota was the proportion 
each part had to contribute to make up for any shortfall in tariff 
revenue.
18 Berend and Ránki argue that by the turn of the century 
the question of an independent Hungarian customs area had nearly 
                                                 
15 Good, Economic Rise; Komlos, Customs union, and Stature, nutrition and 
economic development. 
16 Schulze, ‘Austria-Hungary’s economy’. 
17 Bruckmüller and Sandgruber, ‘Concepts of economic integration’, p. 159. 
18 Eddie, ‘Economic policy’, p. 815, and ‘Common expenditures’, pp. 360-2.   9
become the dominant issue in Hungarian politics.
19 However, they 
emphasize that this was so primarily for political and nationalist 
reasons rather than on economic grounds. In the end, and despite 
the political deadlock in Austria’s parliamentary process since 1897 
that grew out of intensifying nationality conflict, the customs union 
continued to be renewed, if need be by imperial decree. ‘The fact that 
the Hungarians did not take advantage of this situation [i.e. the 
political stalemate in the Austrian half of the empire] shows the 
importance of the Austrian market for Hungarian agricultural 
producers’.
20 
While the core political and economic interests of the Germans 
and the Magyars as the dominant groups in the two halves of the 
empire (without either of them having an absolute population 
majority in Austria and Hungary) were recognized and broadly 
accommodated in the constitutional compromise of 1867 that 
established the Dual Monarchy, those of the Slavic people in both 
parts of the empire were not. There is evidence going beyond the 
mere observation of increasingly pervasive nationalism within the 
empire that suggests deepening social and economic separation 
between self-integrating national communities in the decades 
following the Ausgleich
21, Jaworski’s research on boycott movements 
between different ethnic groups within the multi-national setting of 
East Central Europe points to ethnic mobilization as a key element of 
intra-state economic nationalism at work
22. Nationalist élites sought 
to mobilize popular political support for the national cause and to 
advance the economic interests of their clientele. In a similar vein, 
the contributions in Lorenz’ edited volume map the growing inter-
relatedness of national movements and the cooperative movement in 
                                                 
19 Berend and Ránki, ‘Economic factors’. 
20 Bruckmüller and Sandgruber, ‘Concepts of economic integration’, p. 161. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Jaworski, ‘Zwischen ökonomischer Interessenvertretung’.   10
East Central Europe.
23 Whilst, initially, recruitment was based largely 
on professional criteria, over the course of the late nineteenth 
century cooperatives became increasingly organized along ethnic 
lines. ‘Through national segregation on the regional, and, 
increasingly, on the local level, cooperatives evolved from socially 
organized and a-national, into inter-societal, nationally organized 
institutions’
24 during a phase of ‘ethnic segregation’ (broadly, in the 
1860s and ‘70s). This was followed by a phase of ‘ethnic 
mobilization’, much in line with intensifying national conflicts, when 
cooperation became an economic mass movement. A key issue here 
is the drive towards price discrimination through the concentration of 
selling and purchasing power and as a means to strengthen the 
‘national economy’. The theme of ethnically-based economic ‘self-
integration’ as part of Czech national revival features also 
prominently in Albrecht’s study of rural banks and Czech nationalism 
in Bohemia in the second half of the 19
th century.
25  
However, the extent of these phenomena and their overall 
quantitative significance within the broader context of Habsburg 
economic development and their potential role in the empire’s 
eventual dissolution remain problems unresolved
26. The remainder of 
this paper offers the first quantitative assessment of the impact of 






                                                 
23  Lorenz, ed., Cooperatives in ethnic conflicts. See, in particular, the chapters by 
Hunyadi on Transylvania, Struve on Galicia and Lazarvić on Slovenia. 
24  Ibid., p.22 
25  Albrecht, ‘Rural banks’. 
26 Eddie, ‘Economic policy’, pp. 814-22; Bruckmüller and Sandgruber, ‘Concepts of 
economic integration’, p. 160.   11
II 
Our central hypothesis is that the intensification of intra-empire 
economic nationalism led to asymmetric integration of regional 
markets within an overall integrating Habsburg economy. To this end 
we examine the dynamics of market prices across the empire and 
over time: ceteris paribus, two cities with little or no ethno-linguistic 
differences are likely to trade more with each other than cities with 
larger differences, given that trade networks tend to evolve along 
social and ethnic contacts
27. According to Rauch and Trindade
28, 
ethnic networks may promote trade either by providing market 
information or by providing community enforcement of sanctions, for 
example by blacklisting traders who violate specific rules of the 
community. In the first case their effects on trade should be larger 
for trade in differentiated products (for example machinery) than for 
trade in homogeneous products, especially those with ‘reference 
prices’ such as grain
29. In contrast, in the latter case, which has been 
highlighted by Greif and by Rauch and Trindade, community 
sanctions should affect trade independently of the characteristics of 
the traded goods.
30 This network literature speaks to the Habsburg 
case of profound ethnic heterogeneity and the increasingly self-
integrating national communities identified in the historiography and 
provides the theoretical background to this study of grain price 
dynamics. 
In line with many other studies
31, we take non-random, 
systematic deviations from the law of one price as indicators for trade 
costs. Further, we assume that trade costs can be split up into three 
                                                 
27 Greif, ‘Contract Enforceability’; Rauch and Trindade, ‘Ethnic Chinese networks’. 
28 Rauch and Trindade, ‘Ethnic Chinese networks’. 
 
29 Rauch, ‘Business and Social Networks’. 
30  Greif, ‘Contract Enforceability’; Rauch and Trindade, ‘Ethnic Chinese networks’. 
31 E.g. Engel and Rogers, ‘How wide is the border?’; Shiue, ‘Political fragmentation’; 
and Trenkler and Wolf, ‘Integration across borders’.   12
components: trade costs that depend on distance (transport costs), 
trade costs that depend on networks (or related trade creating 
factors), and all causes of trade costs that are location-specific but 
not specific to any pair of locations
32. If both distance-related and 
location-specific trade costs decrease over time, while the strength of 
networks stays high or even rises, the relative impact of the latter on 
trade will increase, which might result in patterns of asymmetric 
integration shaped by network boundaries and intensities. 
The relationship between price dynamics and trade costs is 
examined within a simple analytical framework. Consider two cities i 
and j, letting Pi,t and Pj,t denote the respective prices of the good in 
cities i and j.  Let (pit - pjt ) =  gapijt denote the percentage gap for 
the two prices at time t
33. Assume further that the trade costs are 
proportional to the prices in the importing market place. In line with 
the recent economic geography literature let (1 − e
−τ)Pi,t be the trade 
costs, where τ > 0 is a cost parameter. Then, e
−τPi,t is the per-unit 
revenue when the good is sold in city i. Intuitively, τ depends 
positively on the geographical distance between the cities i and j. 
Moreover, when network effects are present, τ also differs depending 
on whether or not the city populations are part of the same network. 
Finally, trade from j to i is only profitable if Pi,t e
−τ > Pj,t .This results 
in the condition: log(Pi,t/Pj,t) = gapij,t > τ. Hence, arbitrage from j to i 
takes place when the percentage price gap is larger than the cost 
parameter τ. Equivalently, one trades from city i to j only if gapij,t < 
−τ. Thus, we obtain [−τ ; τ ] as a band of no-arbitrage. Within this 
band, no trade occurs that could reduce price differences between the 
two markets because trade costs exceed possible arbitrage profits. 
Obviously, the size of this band increases with τ, which in turn will 
                                                 
32 This is similar to the idea of multilateral resistance in Anderson and van Wincoop, 
‘Gravity with gravitas’. 
33 Shiue, ‘Political fragmentation’.   13
depend on several factors such as transport costs. In the literature, 
this trade cost view is often referred to as a weak form of the law of 
one price.
34 
The quantitative analysis builds on four new data sets: grain 
prices, railway distances, railway freight rates and language statistics. 
The main characteristics of the data are set out below. 
Grain Prices. We use annual current wholesale prices for five types of 
grain (wheat, rye, barley, oats, corn) in twenty major cities of the 
empire to examine the integration of the Habsburg economy over the 
period 1878-1910.
35 Grain prices are given in the original sources in 
the same currency for all cities but sometimes for different volume or 
weight measures. All prices have been converted into Austrian Heller 
per 100 kilograms to make them fully comparable both in the cross-
section and over time. The price data are employed to construct our 
dependent variable, i.e. the log-ratio of grain prices in two cities i and 
j for each year and all of the 190 city-pairs ij. 
Map 1 shows the regional spread of the sample cities across the 
empire and the Habsburg successor states they  came to  belo ng to 
after 1918:  
(a)  Vienna (Lower Austria), Linz (Upper Austria), Graz 
(Styria) and Innsbruck (Tyrol) which became part of the post-
war Austrian Republic;  
(b)  Prague in Bohemia, later becoming the capital of 
Czechoslovakia ;  
(c)     Cracow and Lemberg in Galicia, both cities became part of 
the post-war Polish state;   
                                                 
34 This is equivalent to the so-called spatial arbitrage condition if it is only required 
that prices of the same good at two cities differ at most by the trade costs; see, for 
example, Fackler and Goodwin, ‘Spatial price analysis’. 
35 The main sources for the price data are SJB and ÖSH, augmented by Pribram 
Materialien zur Geschichte (on Vienna), Hoszowoski, ‘Ceny we lwowie w latach’ (on 
Lemberg), Gorkiewicz, ‘Ceny w Krakowie w latach’ (on Cracow), Preisstatistik and 
MSE on Budapest and the other cities in Hungary.   14
(d)  Czernowitz in the Bukowina which was ceded to Romania 
after the First World War;  
(e)  Trieste, in the Littoral, became part of Italy; 
(f)    Budapest, the centre of Hungary in both its pre- and post-
war borders;  
(g)  Bratislava (Pozsony) in the Danube Left Bank district, 
later becoming part of Czechoslovakia; 
(h)  Pecs and Sopron in the Danube Right Bank district, part of 
both pre- and post-war Hungary, as was 
(i)    Szeged in the central Danube-Theiss Basin; 
(j)    Kassa on the right bank of the Theiss river, the area was 
ceded to Czechoslovakia after the First World War;  
(k)   Debreczen and Nagy Varad in the expansive Theiss Left 
Bank district; the predominantly Romanian parts of the region, 
where Nagy Varad was located, were later ceded to Romania 
along with 
(l)    Arad and Temesvar in the Theiss-Maros Basin, and  
(m)  Kolozsvar in Transylvania. 
The cities listed under (a) to (e) were part of the Austrian half of the 
empire (Cisleithania), those under (f) to (g) belonged to the Kingdom 
of Hungary  (Transleithania). 
 
[Map 1 about here] 
 
Railway Distances. The independent variables include, first, the 
shortest railway connection between all 190 city-pairs ij, again for 
each year 1878-1910. By 1878, all cities in the sample had been 
connected to the railway network. However, over time and up to the 
First World War, Austria-Hungary’s railway network became denser 
and many bilateral distances shorter. This is fully accounted for in the   15
time-varying railway distance measures derived here from a wide 
range of sources.
36 
Railway Freight Rates. The distance measures are augmented by 
new, fully time-varying estimates of railway freight rates for grain 
that account for both terminal and variable (i.e. distance-related) rate 
components
37. Used in conjunction with railway distances, they allow 
for the reconstruction of the costs of transport between two cities i 
and j as an alternative independent variable. The estimates of railway 
transport cost are based on material from a diverse set of sources. 
The (US) Bureau of Railway Economics (1915) provides comparative 
1914 freight rate data for a large number of different-length railway 
routes in different countries and for a variety of products. 
Decomposing into terminal and variable charges, we obtain a 1914 
baseline estimate for Austria-Hungary. Noyes provides average 
railway freight rates per ton-mile for Austria-Hungary (and several 
other countries).
38 This information has been converted into indices 
and used to extrapolate back to 1870 both the terminal and variable 
components in the 1914 equations for Austria-Hungary. In addition to 
the impact of changes in freight rates over time, the effect of using 
transport cost so computed as compared to the proxy of simple 
railway distances is quite straightforward: given a common terminal 
component, average transport costs per kilometre decline in distance. 
Figure 1 illustrates the combined effect of falling freight rates and 
shortening distances over the course of the late nineteenth century. 
The greatest gains in terms of declining freight costs were made over 
the longest distances, here exemplified by the Innsbruck-Czernowitz 
connection. 
 
                                                 
36 See the sources listed under Railway Distances (1878-1913). 
37 Schulze, ‘Regional Income Dispersion’. 
38 Noyes, American Railroad Rates.   16
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Languages. For each of the twenty cities we reconstruct the 
composition of its population by language, taking account of the nine 
major languages spoken across the empire. We use ‘main language 
spoken’ (Austrian cities) and ‘mother tongue’ (Hungarian cities) as 
proxies for urban populations’ ethnicity.
39 Table 1 reports population 
composition by language and shows the extent of ethno-linguistic 
heterogeneity both within and across the twenty cities in the sample. 
The data, extracted from the official (decadal) censuses, refer to the 
population within the boundaries of a city and that of the immediately 
adjacent or surrounding administrative district(s). Given the widening 
over time of the geographical and administrative boundaries of some 
of the cities (especially, Budapest, Prague and Vienna), this makes 
for more stable and meaningful ‘catchment areas’. The most striking 
feature here is the pronounced heterogeneity across the cities and, in 
some cases, the shifts in population shares held by the different 
national groups. We use the language data to construct a bilateral 
measure of ethno-linguistic similarity (or ‘matching probability’) of 
the two cities in any one of the 190 city-pairs as an independent 
variable. Section IV below offers robustness checks on this variable’s 
explanatory power.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
How did grain prices in Austria-Hungary evolve over time? 
Figure 2 shows the cross-section average prices of the five grains for 
                                                 
39 The 1880-1910 censuses report only languages spoken, not nationality or 
ethnicity. A comparison of the Austrian 1880 language data with the 1857 census 
data on nationality indicates a very close match, even if allowance is made for 
inter-temporal shifts in the composition. See Horch, ‘Language and identity’ on the 
relationship between language and national identity in the Habsburg context. 
   17
1878-1910. Prices tended to decline until the mid-1880s, then 
fluctuated without a visible trend for about twenty years, before they 
moved upwards in the decade prior to the First World War. Not 
surprisingly, wheat prices were markedly above other grain prices, 
typically followed by rye and barley.  
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
Figure 3 plots the ‘global’ or ‘between’ coefficient of variation over the 
whole cross-section of the twenty cities averaged over wheat, rye, 
barley, oats, and corn, 1878-1910 (solid line). The variation of grain 
prices across cities declined substantially over time, in line with 
previous findings of Good
40. However, it is possible that integration 
proceeded asymmetrically, that is some city pairs may have 
integrated relatively more than others. As a first check, Figure 3 also 
shows the coefficients of variation (calculated again as an average 
over the five grains) within groups of cities that after 1918 belonged 
to the same Habsburg successor state. Finally, the graph shows the 
percentage difference between the ‘between’ and ‘within’ price 
dispersion over time, with the latter calculated as the mean of ‘within 
group’ variations (grey line).  
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
The evidence so far suggests that, first, city-pairs with a common 
post-war border were apparently already in 1878 somewhat better 
integrated than other pairs, which can be explained partly in terms of 
their different average distances. Second, price dispersion declined 
with some fluctuation within all ‘national’ city groups along similar 
                                                 
40 Good, Economic rise.   18
paths. But, third, the percentage gap between ‘global’ and ‘within’ 
price dispersion was increasing during 1878-1910, from about 30 per 
cent to more than 50 per cent: integration became progressively 
asymmetric over the late nineteenth century. 
To explore such asymmetric integration and its origins 
systematically, we examine a balanced panel of price ratios between 
all 190 possible city-pairs in our sample, drawing on a total pool of 
more than 10,000 observations. The analysis of the price dynamics in 
this panel has to take into account that trade costs imply a no-
arbitrage band in relative prices and hence non-linearities. Moreover, 
we need to focus on the cross-section, whilst allowing for product- 
and city-specific factors and - crucially – allowing for structural 
change over time. The basic idea is that on average, higher trade 
costs should limit the scope for arbitrage and hence increase the price 
gap between any pair of cities. Trade costs, in turn, can be 
decomposed and we distinguish three categories: trade costs that 
depend on distance (transportation costs), cost components related 
to networks, and trade costs that are city-specific. We estimate the 
following simple specification: 
 
           ( 1 )  
 
where raildistance is the railway distance between two cities i and j in 
kilometres,  language is a bilateral measure of ethno-linguistic 
similarity between city populations, city is a full set of dummies over 
all cities g to capture unobservable city-specific factors, while ε
k
ij,t  is 
an i.i.d. error  component. The index h stands for the five kinds of 
grain in our sample. The variable language is calculated as  
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where ak
t i, is the percentage share of language k in city i and at time t, 
and n is the total number of language groups (in our case n = 9). 
This is equivalent to summing up over all possible same language 
encounters between individuals from the two different cities in each 
pair and dividing by the total number of all possible encounters for 
that city-pair.
41 
This ‘matching probability’ varies between 0 (no similarity 
between two cities i and j) and 1 (no differences). For example, for 
1910 the lowest score is 0.0003 for the city-pair Lemberg-Debreczen, 
the highest is 0.9864 for Graz-Linz. Note that, similar to Rauch and 
Trindade, we use language as a proxy for membership in a specific 
ethno-linguistic network, say Czech or Hungarian, rather than as a 
control for the costs of communication.
42 We explore the crucial 




To assess the evidence of asymmetric integration across the 
Habsburg regions, we estimate equation (1) using a generalised least 
squares estimator, which allows for heteroskedastictity in the cross-
section. We start by pooling over all five grains and over the whole 
period 1878-1910. Reported standard errors are based on White's 
period robust coefficient variance estimator throughout, to 
accommodate for serial correlation in the price data. Table 2, column 
1, shows the results. 
                                                 
41 The underlying absolute figures are truncated to facilitate a full match of the 
Austrian and Hungarian language groups. The very small group of ‘other languages’ 
(i.e. those different from the nine main languages referred to in Table 1), which is 
not reported for Austrian cities and for Hungary available only for 1910, is 
excluded. 
42  Rauch and Trindade, ‘Ethnic Chinese networks’.   20
 
[Table 2 about here] 
  
As hypothesized, we find that, whilst controlling for 
unobservable city-specific effects, price differentials increased 
significantly in distance between the cities and decreased in the 
ethno-linguistic match between their populations. The coefficient on 
language is negative (i.e. the larger ethnic congruency between 
cities, the smaller the price gap) and highly significant, which here is 
interpreted as evidence of trade costs related to ethnic networks.   
This finding is robust to the theoretically and empirically 
preferable use of time-varying transport costs instead of railway 
distances. We re-estimate equation (1), replacing raildistance by 
freightcost, a measure that fully accounts for inter-temporal changes 
in both distances (due to the extension of the railway network over 
time) and freight rates. Table 2, column 2, gives the results. While 
measuring transport costs properly makes some difference (the 
relevant coefficient is now smaller  than before), the results are 
materially unchanged. Note that in both cases language is estimated 
to be highly significant after controlling for distance or transport 
costs. The variation in our sample is sufficiently high to distinguish 
between bilateral price differences related to distance and bilateral 
price differences related to network effects. While, in general, very 
distant cities also tended to be characterized by different ethno-
linguistic profiles of their populations, our sample has a lot of 
variation in this respect. Consider the following examples. In 1910, 
there were only 58 railway kilometres lying between Arad and 
Temesvar in Hungary, the shortest bilateral distance in our sample 
and about one ninth the median distance. This contrasts with the 
1,515 kilometres between the two cities furthest apart - Innsbruck in 
the west of Austria and Czernowitz on its eastern periphery. However,   21
despite these stark differences in bilateral distances, the two city 
pairs were characterized by virtually identical bilateral matching 
probabilities of .28 to .29. Further, the two cities least similar in 
terms of their ethno-linguistic composition, Lemberg and Debreczen, 
were only 432 kilometres apart – far less than the median distance of 
538 kilometres.  
The observed price differentials cannot be explained by major 
systematic administrative barriers to trade like tariffs or different 
currency regimes since such barriers were not in place in the 
Habsburg customs and monetary union. Whatever minor and, 
effectively, unobservable impediments to inter-regional trade there 
were, these are likely picked up in the location dummies. What needs 
accounting for is the significant impact of ethno-linguistic networks 
which is evident despite controlling for transport costs and location-
specific factors. A key to the nature of network-driven asymmetric 
integration may lie in changing patterns over time. There is no a 
priori reason to assume that such network effects were present over 
the whole period. On the contrary, the political historiography stresses 
the rise in intra-empire national conflict from the late 1880s and, for 
instance, the political deadlock between Czechs and Germans from the 
early 1890s
43, while recent research on intra-state economic 
nationalism emphasizes the growing significance of ethnic mobilization 
and antagonism during the 1890s
44. If the historical literature is about 
right on the intensification of national conflict in Austria-Hungary, we 
would expect our proxy for ethnic network membership (language) to 
be far more powerful in explaining persistent price differentials after, 
say, the early 1890s than before. To explore the issue systematically, 
                                                 
43 See Berend History derailed; Kornish, ‘Constitutional aspects’; and Sked, Decline 
and fall. 
44 Bruckmüller and Sandgruber, ‘Concepts of economic integration’; Jaworski, 
‘Zwischen ökonomischer Interessenvertretung’; and Lorenz, ed., Cooperatives in 
Ethnic Conflicts.   22
we extend model (1) and estimate equation (3), using fully time-
varying  freightcost as an independent variable and allowing the 
coefficient on the network measure (language) to vary between two 




           ( 3 )
  w h e r e   D1 is an intercept dummy for 1895-1910. The results 
are set out in Table 3, column 1. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
While the estimated coefficient on freightcost remains positive 
and significant as expected, the negative coefficient on language is 
small and statistically insignificant for the period 1878-94, but much 
larger and statistically highly significant for the years after 1895. This 
result would suggest that ethno-linguistic networks exercised no 
material influence on the pattern of market integration in the 1870s 
and 1880s, but did so in the 1890s and early 1900s. This quantitative 
finding thus ties in well with the qualitative historiography that 
emphasizes the growth and prevalence of antagonism between 
different nationalities in the last two decades or so prior to the First 
World War. 
Note that features of natural geography such as mountains, 
rivers, or access to seaports cannot possibly account for the observed 
changes over time due to their time-invariant nature.
45 However, 
what might have influenced the pattern of relative integration across 
                                                 
45 For example, the potential significance of waterborne transport along the 
Danube, say between Vienna, Bratislava and Budapest, is taken into account 
through the use of city dummies. 
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Austria-Hungary is changing integration or disintegration with 
neighbouring regions in other countries. For example, the large 
changes in German and Russian tariffs 1878-1910 might have 
affected different regions of the Habsburg economy in different ways. 
We can take this into account by adding to model (3) a set of time-
varying city effects, to capture city-specific integration or 
disintegration shocks. Table 3, column 2, shows that the introduction 
of time-specific city-effects does not alter the results.  
It is straightforward to show that the effect exercised by ethno-
linguistic networks on the pattern of market integration in the two 
decades prior to the Great War was considerable. A one-standard 
deviation decrease in matching probability implied ceteris paribus a 
stronger increase in (log) grain price-spreads than a one standard 
deviation increase in (log) freight costs. Put differently, the estimated 
effect of halving the matching probability would have increased the 
(log) grain price-spreads by 27% as compared to an increase of 
roughly 9% in response to doubling the average (log) freight costs.
46  
We conclude that city- and time-specific differences in 
integration - such as varying degrees of integration with neighbouring 
regions - cannot explain the observed asymmetric integration within 
the Habsburg economy. However, the extent of ethno-linguistic 
congruence between locations, measured as a matching probability, 





                                                 
46 To see this, define the probability of non-matching as (1-language), which 
essentially only inverts the sign of the estimated coefficients. A doubling of this 
variable will on average have the effect of (-1)*2*0.1492 = 0.2984 (see table 3, 
column 2). This translates into a 25% increase in the average log-price-spread as 
compared to a 2*0.0486=0.0978 or a 8.9% increase in response to doubling 
average (log) freight costs.     24
IV 
The argument here is that language statistics can capture 
membership in ethno-linguistic networks, which in turn help explain 
the emerging pattern of asymmetric integration within the late 
nineteenth century Habsburg economy. However, for this argument 
to hold, one needs to be able to distinguish between ‘community 
effects’ and ‘communication effects’ of membership in an ethno-
linguistic network. Networks can provide market information, which 
should be facilitated by the ability to speak a common or at least a 
very similar language.
47 They can also provide community 
enforcement of sanctions, for example, by blacklisting traders who 
violate community rules. In the first case, one would expect 
significant network effects on trade in differentiated products and far 
less so on trade in homogeneous products like wheat or rye. In the 
second case, however, community sanctions are seen as affecting 
trade independently of the characteristics of the traded goods.
48 It 
should not matter whether it is trade in grain or trade in machinery or 
textiles. Since the focus here is on grain markets only, it is the 
second effect that likely matters most in our case. Following Dyen et 
al. and using the lexicostatistical similarities between languages, the 
‘matching probability’ is extended to permit the identification of 
‘communication effects’ as distinct from ‘community effects’.
49  
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=                                      (4) 
 
where SW200 is the index of lexicostatistical similarity between 
languages k and l based on the Swadesh-200 list of basic words as 
                                                 
47 Rauch and Trindade, ‘Ethnic Chinese networks’. 
48 Greif, ‘Contract enforceability’; Rauch and Trindade, ‘Ethnic Chinese networks’. 
49 Dyen, Kruskal and Black, ‘Indo-European Classification’.   25
used in Dyen et al.
50 For example, the SW200 index is 0.660 for 
Romanian and Italian, 0.223 for Romanian and Czech, 0.249 for 
Romanian and German, 0.766 for Czech and Polish, and 0.259 for 
Czech and German. The new DyenComm index then measures the 
probability that any two citizens from, say, Lemberg and Arad 
meeting can actually communicate without necessarily sharing the 
same mother tongue. The point of the exercise is to use the available 
language data via (4) in such manner that they capture the 
communication effects rather than the effects of membership in a 
specific community. In light of our hypothesis that it is community 
effects that drive the findings on grain price dispersion, we expect 
adding the communication index (4) as a control to have little effect 
on the results. Table 4, column 1, confirms this. The coefficient on 
the communications variable is either insignificant or of the wrong 
sign while the network effects captured in the matching probability 
(language) remain large and significant for the post-1894 period as 
before. Hence the evidence suggests that it was not communication 
as such that was the problem but rather growing conflict between 
distinct ethno-linguistic groups. Asymmetric integration was an 
outcome of intra-empire economic nationalism. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
However, one cannot exclude the possibility that this result of 
powerful community effects may be driven by the specific metric of a 
‘matching probability’ used here. To deal with this issue we can define 
                                                 
50 Hungarian is not part of the Indo-European language family. We therefore set the 
index to zero for all pair-wise combinations with Hungarian, which tends to 
understate the ability to communicate between city populations. Similarly, we 
n e g l e c t  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  m a n y  p e o p l e  w i l l  h a v e  b e e n  a b l e  t o  s p e a k  m o r e  t h a n  o n e  
language. This again leads us to underestimate the ability to communicate between 
city populations. 
   26
an alternative bilateral index of ethno-linguistic heterogeneity that is 










k t ij a a HFLang − Σ =
=                      (5) 
 
If both cities have an identical ethno-linguistic composition the index 
equals zero. If there is no overlap in the ethno-linguistic composition, 
the index equals one as its maximum. Like the initial matching 
probability,  it varies between 0 and 1 and so reflects the idea that 
trade costs between a pair of cities are expected to increase in the 
ethno-linguistic heterogeneity between them.
51 As shown in Table 4, 
column 2, the results remain unchanged compared to column 1. Thus 
the finding of strong community effects is robust to alternative 




Ethno-linguistic networks made for severely asymmetric market 
integration in the late nineteenth century Habsburg Empire. One way 
to show how this finding matters, and to shed light on its broader 
historical implications, is to explore the predictive power of pre-war 
intra-empire economic nationalism for the formation of the post-war 
boundaries between the Habsburg successor states. We consider the 
probability that any two cities in the sample would be separated by a 
border after 1918, given the observed changes in price spreads 
between cities during 1878-1910. While, again, distinguishing 
between the two major periods 1878-94 and 1895-1910, the 
approach involves estimating whether the change in the average 
                                                 
51 Note the different expected signs on the coefficients for the matching probability 
and the Herfindahl measure.   27
price spread (i.e. log price-ratio) between the two periods can predict 
city pairs’ future separation by a border, controlling for inter-temporal 
changes in transportation cost. The rationale is quite straightforward: 
all the evidence so far suggests that growing economic nationalism is 
visible in a widening spread in grain prices when distance-related 
trade costs are properly controlled for. 
  Using Binary Probit, we construct a dependent variable borderij 
which takes the value of 1 if cities i and j were separated by a border 
after the First World War and 0 otherwise. The independent variable 
spreadchangeij is the change in the (period) average price spread, 
standardized by (period) average transportation cost, between cities i 
and j. The relevant averages are computed over the two respective 
periods 1878-94 and 1895-1910. The results are reported in Table 5 
where column 1 refers to just two grains (wheat and rye) for which 
price data are available for all years and locations; column 2 refers to 
all five grains where the number of observations is smaller due to 
missing price data for some grains and city pairs. 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
In  both cases, the coefficient on spreadchange is highly 
significant: the larger the change in bilateral price differentials over 
time, which is unexplained by a change in transport costs (or 
distance-related trade costs), the higher the probability of a post-
1918 border between two cities. This finding is far from trivial. 
Common sense would suggest that the probability of any two cities to 
be separated by a border after the war should increase in their 
geographical distance and distance-related trade costs. The new 
evidence presented here shows that after controlling for this, the 
pattern of price dynamics helps predicting the future political borders. 
If it was economic nationalism that drove asymmetric integration   28
(and widening relative price differentials) in the pre-war period, then 
it is not too far fetched to hypothesize that it was pre-war economic 
nationalism that, effectively, shaped the lines along which the empire 




In this paper we argue that two seemingly contradictory strands in 
the literature – one emphasizing the centrifugal impact of growing 
intra-empire nationalism, the other stressing significant 
improvements in market integration across the empire – can be 
reconciled. The process of overall market integration across the 
Habsburg domains, though ongoing, was profoundly asymmetric: 
some localities were more rapidly and deeply integrating with each 
other than others – and ‘national biases’ played a key role in that. 
Empire-wide absolute declines in price differentials between regions 
or towns went thus hand-in-hand with profound regional differentials 
in relative integration (or even relative disintegration). The extent of 
ethno-linguistic heterogeneity across regions and cities became a 
force making for asymmetric intra-empire market integration from 
the late 1880s, early 1890s onwards, roughly in line with the time 
pattern suggested by the historiography of rising national conflict 
across the empire. This, the analysis suggests, was the outcome of 
two factors, in particular. First, as markets became more closely 
integrated as a result of declining transport costs, the relative 
importance of other non-distance related barriers to inter-regional 
exchange, such as ethnic or linguistic differences, increased. Second, 
the  absolute importance of these differences rose with increasingly 
ethnically-based forms of social and economic organisation such as 
trade co-operatives, especially from the mid-1880s. While the 
formation of ethno-linguistic networks entailed a lowering of   29
information costs among members and helped diffuse common 
preferences, it also reduced the extent of effective exchange with 
non-network members. It has been shown here that it was not 
growing difficulties in communication between ethno-linguistic groups 
that led to growing price differentials between different markets, but 
rather intensifying conflict between them.    
These findings tie in well with recent qualitative work on the 
prevalence of intra-state economic nationalism in Central and Eastern 
Europe. This literature suggests that ethnically-based networks 
increasingly affected trading costs between different ethnic groups by 
systematically directing trade towards the own group.
52 Jaworski’s   
research on boycott movements between different ethnic groups 
within the multi-national setting of East Central Europe points to 
ethnic mobilization as a key element of intra-state economic 
nationalism at work. Nationalist élites sought to mobilize popular 
political support for the national cause and to advance the economic 
interests of their clientele. If so, arbitrage trade between ethnic 
groups became increasingly limited and hence affected price 
dynamics in a similar way as other, e.g. distance related, trading 
costs. In his study of rural cooperatives in Galicia, Struve identifies a 
key feature that applies not only to the specific case he investigates 
but more broadly to the late nineteenth century nation-building 
efforts that evolved within the multi-ethnic Habsburg setting: ‘(…) 
different nation-building projects competed with one another’.
53 This 
‘competition’, the evidence suggests, acquired an increasingly 
exclusionary quality – Bruckmüller and Sandgruber’s ‘self-integrating 
national communities’
54 were indeed alive, ventured to keep ‘others’ 
                                                 
52 Jaworski, ‘Zwischen ökonomischer Interessenvertretung’; Lorenz, ed., 
Cooperatives in Ethnic Conflicts. 
53 Struve, ‘Peasant emancipation’, p.229. 
54 Bruckmüller and Sandgruber, ‘Concepts of economic integration’.   30
out and so foreshadowed the break-up of the Habsburg Empire a 
generation later.    31
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Table 1. Main languages spoken (shares in total population) 
 German  Czech/Slovak  Polish  Ukrainian  Slovene Serbo-Croat  Italian  Romanian Hungarian 
 1880  1910  1880  1910  1880  1910  1880  1910  1880  1910  1880  1910  1880  1910  1880  1910 1880  1910 
Vienna  0.958  0.941  0.036  0.054  0.003  0.003  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 
Linz  0.984  0.995  0.015  0.004  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 
Graz  0.982  0.991  0.009  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.008  0.006  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 
Innsbruck  0.985  0.976  0.002  0.002  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.002  0.000  0.002  0.000  0.000  0.013  0.016  0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 
Prag  0.165  0.068  0.834  0.930  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 
Lemberg  0.084  0.024  0.002  0.002  0.650  0.750  0.262  0.223  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.000 0.000  0.000 
Cracow  0.039  0.024  0.007  0.012  0.953  0.959  0.001  0.004  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 
Czernowitz  0.266  0.288  0.004  0.003  0.071  0.098  0.479  0.383  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.180  0.228 0.000  0.000 
Trieste  0.043  0.062  0.001  0.003  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.218  0.298  0.001  0.013  0.738  0.623  0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 
Budapest  0.212  0.084  0.065  0.029  0.006  0.006  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.010  0.005  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.002 0.705  0.872 
Pozsony  0.183  0.137  0.456  0.434  0.002  0.002  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.007  0.005  0.001  0.001  0.000  0.000 0.351  0.421 
Pecs  0.347  0.332  0.008  0.007  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.002  0.002  0.115  0.069  0.001  0.001  0.002  0.000 0.525  0.588 
Sopron  0.413  0.387  0.004  0.004  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.117  0.110  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.000 0.464  0.497 
Szeged  0.012  0.009  0.004  0.002  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.002  0.004  0.001  0.000  0.001  0.001 0.980  0.983 
Kassa  0.069  0.031  0.293  0.181  0.004  0.004  0.003  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.631  0.781 
Debreczen  0.017  0.004  0.003  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.001 0.978  0.994 
Nagyvarad  0.010  0.005  0.011  0.013  0.001  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.435  0.413 0.542  0.568 
Arad  0.107  0.094  0.012  0.014  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.002  0.000  0.000  0.007  0.005  0.001  0.000  0.639  0.584 0.233  0.301 
Temesvar  0.350  0.328  0.016  0.012  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.141  0.133  0.000  0.000  0.421  0.363 0.070  0.164 
Kolozsvar  0.042  0.029  0.002  0.001  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.612  0.574 0.343  0.395 
Sources: Austria – Census (1880-1910); Hungary – Census (1880-1910) 
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Table 2. Asymmetric integration – balanced sample, 
 basic results, 1878-1910 
Pooled EGLS 
 
Variable     Coeff.  (t-stat.)   Coeff.  (t-stat.) 
 
Constant       1.0629 (14.896)    0.9329 (12.174) 
log(raildistance)      0.0096 (0.848)         
log(freightcost)         0.0286  (2.566) 
language    -0.0979  (-3.148)   -0.0797  (-2.611) 
fixed  city  effects     yes       yes 
no.  of  obs.    10,070    10,070 
adj. R
2  (weighted)  0.8848    0.8856 
  
dep. var. log price-ratio as defined in text; White period standard 






Table 3. Asymmetric integration – balanced sample, time 
variation and city-specific shocks 
Pooled EGLS 
 
Variable     Coeff.  (t-stat.) Coeff.  (t-stat.) 
 
constant         0.7785 (9.447)   0.8134 (9.510) 
D95-10        0.1324  (9.998)  -0.0289  (-0.893) 
log(freightcost)      .0.0445 (3.829)   0.0486 (4.049) 
language*D78-94     -0.0200 (-0.550)  0.0083 (0.208) 
language*D95-10     -0.1545 (-5.242) -0.1492 (-4.062) 
fixed  city  effects    yes    no 
time-varying city effects  no      yes 
no.  of  obs.     10,070   10,070 
adj. R
2  (weighted)   0.8488   0.8589 
  
dep. var. log price-ratio as defined in text; White period standard 
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Table 4. Communty vs. communication effects, 





Variable   Coeff.  (t-stat.)    Coeff.  (t-stat.)  
 
constant       0.8137 (9.742)     0.8115 (9.473) 
D95-10     -0.0477  (-1.411)   -0.1624  (-3.108) 
log(freightcost)     0.0486 (4.127)     0.0494 (4.186) 
language*D78-94     0.0189 (0.170) 
language*D95-10   -0.4160  (-4.074) 
dyencomm*D78-94  -0.0093 (-0.099)   -0.0002 (-0.002) 
dyencomm*D95-10    0.2643 (3.185)     0.2373 (3.147) 
hflang*D78-94       -0.0097  (-0.084) 
hflang*D95-10         0.3862  (4.086) 
time-varying city effects  yes        yes 
no.  of  obs.     10,070    10,070 
adj. R
2  (weighted)   0.8632    0.8618 
  
dep. var. log price-ratio as defined in text; White period standard 






Table 5. Pre-war integration and post-war boundaries 
Binary Probit 
two grains                   five grains 
Variable     Coeff.  (z-stat.)   Coeff.  (z-stat.)  
   
constant      0.5160 (3.104)     0.3785 (1.630) 
spreadchange   4.2283  (3.948)     5.0359 (3.085) 
 
log-likelihood   -76.9857    -31.6387 
restr. log-likelihood   82.8708      -36.5087 
LR statistic      11.7703         9.7400 
probability (LR stat)   0.0006         0.0018 
no. of obs.            190                77 
McFadden R
2      0.0710         0.1334 
  
dep. var. border as defined in text; Huber/White standard errors 
and covariance         41
 
Figure 1. Total freight cost per ton of grain (old pence), 
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Figure 3: Coefficient of Variation 
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